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1. INTRODUCTION
The 2001 Laeken Declaration on the future of the European Union strongly 
asserted the need for the EU to be(come) a prominent global actor:1 ‘Does 
Europe not, now that is finally unified, have a leading role to play in a new world 
order, that of a power able both to play a stabilising role worldwide and to point 
the way ahead for many countries and peoples?’ Via the meanderings of the 
Draft Constitution, the Lisbon Treaty translated this ambition into a number of 
external objectives (Articles 3 (5) and 21 TEU). In order to bring to fruition these 
ambitious objectives, the Treaty of Lisbon strengthened the institutional dimen-
sion of EU external representation, in particular through the establishment of 
the European External Action Service (‘EEAS’).2 
This new body has been called ‘the first structure of a common European 
diplomacy’.3 however, the EU is not a state, although it is an active participant 
in the diplomatic network of states that is – primarily ‒ regulated by the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 (‘VCDR’)4 and the Vienna Conven-
tion on Consular Relations of 1963 (‘VCCR’).5 Currently 138 Union delegations 
are active in states around the World, and at international organizations.6 The 
EU’s intensified global diplomatic ambitions in external representation trigger 
the question to which extent they are compatible with the European and inter-
national legal framework? Traditionally, diplomatic relations are established 
between states and the legal framework is strongly state-oriented. The EU is 
not a state but an international organization, albeit a very special one. It enjoys 
international legal personality, which allows it to enter into legal relations with 
1 European Council, Laeken Declaration on the future of the European Union, 14-15 Decem-
ber, 2001, subheading ‘Expectations of Europe’s citizens’.
2 Council Decision 2010/427/EU of 26 July 2010 establishing the organisation and functioning 
of the European External Action Service, OJ 2010 L 201/30 (‘EEAS Decision’).
3 ‘Consular and Diplomatic Protection: Legal framework in the EU Member States’, Report 
of the EU CARE project, December 2010, at 31; available at <http://www.careproject.eu/images/
stories/ConsularAndDiplomatic-Protection.pdf>.
4 The VCDR was signed on 18 April 1961, entry into force 24 April 1964, United Nations 
Treaty Series, vol. 500, 95, No. 301. Currently 187 states are party to the VCDR. See <http://
treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails. aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=III-3&chapter=3&lang=en>.
5 The VCCR was adopted 24 April 1963, entered into force 19 March 1967, currently 172 
states parties, United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 596, 262.
6 Updates may be found at <http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/web_en.htm>. See also the 
EEAS document ‘EU Diplomatic Representation in third countries – first half of 2012’, Council of 
the European Union, Doc. 18975/1/11, REV 1, 11 January 2012.
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states and other international organizations.7 At the same time, its external 
competences are limited by the principle of conferral,8 and in many cases the 
EU is far from exclusively competent and shares its powers with the Member 
States. Indeed, the TEU mandates that ‘essential state functions’9 of the Mem-
ber States are to be respected by the Union and it is in diplomatic relations in 
particular that one may come across these state functions.10 finally, within the 
Union the new diplomatic Service is by no means the sole competent institution 
for EU external relations.
With this EU-internal complexity in mind, the present paper will utilize the 
VCDR’s description of ‘diplomatic activities’ in its Article 3, and on that basis, 
the article will explore the Union’s ‘diplomatic ambitions’ through its newly es-
tablished EEAS. Subsequently, this contribution will then confront these with 
the European and international legal reality. It will analyse to which extent the 
current legal framework is able to allow the EU to act alongside states at the 
global level in exercising a number of diplomatic functions. Thus, in this paper 
we shall focus on five distinct aspects of diplomatic relations by the Union first, 
establishing a formal EU presence through its delegations; second, represent-
ing the Union through the delivery of statements in multilateral fora; third, dip-
lomatic relations through visits and missions by top EU officials at political 
level; fourth, the task of gathering information by the Delegations as ‘EU em-
bassies’; fifth and finally, the task of diplomatic protection of ‘EU citizens’. In all 
these areas, we shall explore the extent to which EU and international law is 
supportive or obstructive to successfully completing these diplomatic tasks.
2. ThE EEAS AS A CATALYST fOR ThE EU’S DIPLOMATIC 
DEVELOPMENT
In the report of December 2011 evaluating the first year of the new Diplomatic 
Service, its foundation is viewed as a historic opportunity to rise above ‘internal 
debates pertaining to institutional and constitutional reform’, and instead to 
focus on ‘delivering new substance to the EU’s external action’.11 There is 
certainly no lack of ambition in post-Lisbon EU external relations, prompting 
 7 See more extensively R. A. Wessel, ‘Revisiting the International Legal Status of the EU’, 
European Foreign Affairs Review (2000), at 507-537; R. A. Wessel, ‘The European Union as a 
Party to International Agreements: Shared Competences, Mixed Responsibilities’, in A. Dash-
wood and M. Maresceau (eds.) Law and Practice of EU External Relations – Salient Features of 
a Changing Landscape, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, at 145-180.
 8 Art. 5 TEU.
 9 Cf. Art. 4(2) TEU.
10 The EEAS Decision acknowledges this in Art. 5(9): ‘The Union delegations shall work in 
close cooperation and share information with the diplomatic services of the Member States’. See 
also B. Van Vooren, ‘A Legal-Institutional Perspective on the European External Actions Service’, 
CMLR (2011), at 475-502, who points out that due to consistency obligations this should be read 
as a general obligation to cooperate between the EEAS and the national diplomatic services (at 
497).
11 European External Action Service, ‘Report by the high Representative to the European 
Parliament, the Council and the Commission’, 22 December 2011, at 2.
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one commentator to observe that ‘if there was an international award for “en-
thusiasm”, the EU would stand good chances for winning it.’12 Such enthusiasm 
indeed permeated the 2001 Laeken Declaration, as was clear from the quota-
tion above.13 The Lisbon Treaty is the result of that political ambition, and aims 
to create a more coherent, effective and visible foreign policy for the Union.14 
Two of the major innovations are the explicit mission statement for EU interna-
tional relations embedded as a binding obligation in EU primary law; and the 
new diplomatic body (the EEAS) to bring them to fruition. In relation to the 
former innovation, the Lisbon Treaty has introduced in its constituting document 
strongly worded external values and objectives the EU ‘shall’ promote and 
pursue in the world. As regards values, in Article 3 (5) TEU we find a list which 
sketches the EU’s cosmopolitan – if romantic15 – view of a just global order. 
Additionally, Article 21 TEU now bundles into a single, strongly-worded provi-
sion all international objectives to be pursued across all EU internal and exter-
nal policies. It would be incorrect to consider these Treaty articles as nothing 
more than empathic claims or ambitions with no legal substantive consequence 
for EU institutions and Member States.16 They are legally binding in their nature 
as constitutional objectives of EU law, and Article 4 (3) TEU requires of the EU 
institutions and Member States ‘sincere cooperation in carrying out tasks which 
flow from the Treaties’. That this duty of cooperation is judicially enforceable is 
well known,17 but in a recent judgment of 22 December 2011 the Court also 
affirmed the binding nature of EU values stated in Article 3 (5) TEU, in that it 
imposes a substantive, legal obligation on the Union ’to contribute to the strict 
observance and the development of international law.’18 In sum, when the EEAS 
is to deliver ‘new diplomatic substance’, the Treaties provide binding guidance 
on the method and substance of EU action in the world. how do these new 
legal obligations of effort – obviously not of result – translate into concrete 
diplomatic ambitions to be brought to fruition through the EEAS? So as to 
structure our reply to that question, we must briefly reflect on what we under-
stand under the notion of ‘diplomacy’. 
12 J. Larik, ‘Shaping the International Order as a Union Objective and the Dynamic Interna-
tionalisation of Constitutional Law’, CLEER Working Papers 2011/5, 2011, at 7.
13 European Council, ‘Declaration on the future of the European Union’, Laeken 14-15 De-
cember, 2001, subheading ‘Expectations of Europe’s citizens’.
14 The European Convention, ‘final Report of Working Group VII on External Action’, CONV 
459/02, Brussels, 16 December 2002.
15 Larik, op.cit., 12 (who refers to the ‘cosmopolitan romanticism’ of that treaty article).
16 See for a prominent example: Catherine Ashton, ‘Statement by high Representative Cath-
erine Ashton on Europe Day’, Brussels, 7 May 2011, A 177/11.
17 A. Delgado Casteleiro and J. Larik, ‘The Duty to Remain Silent: Limitless Loyalty in EU 
External Relations’, European Law Review (2011).
18 See Case C-366/10 Air Transport Association of America (ATAA), of 21 December 2011, 
not yet reported, para. 101. here the Court utilizes Article 3(5) TEU in its reasoning and indicates 
that this article implies a substantive obligation for the EU. On the legal binding nature of objec-
tives listed in Article 21 TEU, see: B. Van Vooren, ‘The Small Arms Judgment in an Age of Consti-
tutional Turmoil’, European Foreign Affairs Review 14(1) 2009, at 231-248.
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Defining such a rather open-ended concept is outside the scope of this 
paper,19 and hence we utilize the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 
(VCDR) to shed light on ambitions flowing from EU primary law. The VCDR 
does not exhaustively define diplomacy, but it does list in Article 3 that the 
functions to be carried out by a diplomatic mission are, inter alia to engage in 
the following five activities: (a) Representing the sending State in the receiving 
State; (b) Protecting in the receiving State the interests of the sending State 
and of its nationals, within the limits permitted by international law; (c) Negoti-
ating with the Government of the receiving State; (d) Ascertaining by all lawful 
means conditions and developments in the receiving State, and reporting ther-
eon to the Government of the sending State; and (e) Promoting friendly relations 
between the sending State and the receiving State, and developing their eco-
nomic, cultural and scientific relations. The objective of this paper is to examine 
the legal specificity of the Union in light of its new diplomatic ambitions post-
Lisbon. Utilizing article 3 VCDR and its description of what are the most com-
mon activities of external diplomatic representation, we view the following 
areas as potentially problematic for the Union to pursue them in a fashion 
similar to that of states:
 
(a) The formal status of Union Delegations and their staff in third countries 
and IO’s;
(b) the legal existence of the EU as a single entity post-Lisbon, and its repre-
sentation through demarches at multilateral fora where Member States 
are equally present;
(c) the conduct of diplomatic relations through visits and missions to third 
countries and international organizations by the EU’s highest political 
representatives such as the European Council or Commission Presidents, 
as well as Commissioners and the hR/VP;
(d) the task of political reporting by EU delegations, in the complex inter-insti-
tutional and Member State landscape that characterizes the EU;
(e) and finally, the protection of ‘European Union’ citizens not merely as derived 
from Member State nationality but as an independent legal reality.
3. DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION BY ThE EU AND ThE REALITY 
Of EUROPEAN LAW
3.1. the organization of Union delegations
The first indent of Article 3 (1) VCDR reads ‘Represent the sending state in the 
receiving state’.20 Several EU Treaty articles provide a solid basis for the Union 
to establish a formal and substantive presence as a single, fully matured dip-
19 G. Berridge, ‘Diplomacy: theory and practice’ Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, at 282; K. 
hamilton and R. Langhorne, The practice of diplomacy: its evolution, theory and administration, 
2nd edition, London: Routledge, 2011, at 317.
20 Art. 3(a) VCDR.
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lomatic actor represented in third countries and international organisations 
(IOs).21 As regards the physical presence through its delegations, EU activities 
are based on Article 221 (1) TfEU, which was newly inserted with the Lisbon 
Treaty: ‘Union delegations in third countries and at international organisations 
shall represent the Union.’ The ambition flowing from this new provision in the 
TfEU should be quite clear: The Union no longer wishes to have an interna-
tional presence through delegations of only one of its institutions (e.g. Com-
mission delegations), or through the diplomats of the Member State holding 
the rotating Presidency.22 The working group on external relations in the Euro-
pean Convention pointed out that too many spoke on behalf of the EU and that 
‘in diplomacy a lot depended on trust and personal relationships’, which require 
a stable and coherent presence on the part of the Union.23 The purpose of this 
new treaty provision was to have ‘less Europeans and more EU’,24 e.g. a single 
diplomatic presence for the Union speaking on behalf of a single legal entity 
active globally. When Mrs Ashton took up her post in December 2009, she said 
that the EU delegations ‘should be a network that is the pride of Europe and 
the envy of the rest of the world’ and ‘a trusted and reliable ally on European 
issues’.25 Speaking on Europe Day 2011 she underlined this continued ambi-
tion, that the EEAS should be a ‘single platform to protect European values 
and interests around the world’, and ‘a one stop shop for our partners.’26 Im-
plementing this ambition has meant that the former ‘Commission Delegations’ 
have been turned into ‘Union delegations’27 and that for all practical diplo-
matic purposes they are seen as EU ‘embassies’.28 In this respect, heads of 
Delegations de facto act as ‘EU Ambassadors’,29 with for example the letter of 
credentials presented to President Obama by Mr. Vale de Almeira opening with 
the words ‘As I assume the role of the European Union’s Ambassador and 
head of Delegation to the United States [...]’30 The EU heads of delegations 
21 Art, 220 and 221 TfEU, io Article 3(5) and 21(1) TEU.
22 But see the EEAS document ‘EU Diplomatic Representation in third countries – first half of 
2012’, Council of the European Union, Doc. 18975/1/11, REV 1, 11 January 2012, which reveals 
that in some countries the EU is still represented by a Member State.
23 ‘The European Convention, final report of Working Group VII on External Action’, CONV 
459/02, Brussels, 16 December 2002, at 321.
24 A. Missiroli, ‘The New EU foreign Policy System After Lisbon: A Work in Progress’, 25 (4) 
European Foreign Affairs Review , (2010), at 427 – 452.
25 high Representative Catherine Ashton, ‘Quiet diplomacy will get our voice heard’, The 
Times, 17 December 2009.
26 high Representative Catherine Ashton, ‘Statement by high Representative Catherine Ash-
ton on Europe Day’, Brussels, 7 May 2011, A 177/11.
27 European External Action Service, ‘Report by the high Representative to the European 
Parliament, the Council and the Commission’, 22 December 2011, at 16 and see also f. Berg-
müller, ‘The EEAS: A Loss for the European Commission’s External Relations Capacities?’, in 
Paul Quinn (ed.), Making European Diplomacy Work: Can the EEAS Deliver?, College of Europe, 
EU Diplomacy Paper, 8/2011
28 J. Wouters and S. Duquet, ‘The EU and International Diplomatic Law: New horizons?’ 
7 Hague Journal of Diplomacy (2012) at 31-49.
29 J. Wouters and S. Duquet, op.cit., who point out that this is granted as a ‘Courtesy title’ by 
receiving states.
30 See the introduction to the ‘Letter of Credentials from Ambassador Vale de Almeira to Pres-
ident of the United States Barack Obama.’ An extract of the letter is available through the Press 
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representing the Union in third states and at international organisations are 
thus conferred the authority to perform functions equivalent to those of na-
tional diplomats. In the reverse situation, the EU also continues the traditions 
of inter-state diplomacy: it is now President Van Rompuy who receives the 
letters of credentials of the heads of Missions to the European Union of third 
countries, accompanied with the usual (e.g. state-like) protocol and official 
photograph.31 
The transformation from Commission delegations into proper Embassies 
was not purely formal, but was in some cases accompanied by added powers 
to at least some of those representations abroad. While all 138 Commission 
delegations32 were transformed into EU Delegations mere weeks after the 
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, 54 were immediately transformed into ‘EU 
embassies’ in all but name.33 This meant that these ‘super-missions’ were not 
merely given the new name, but also new powers in the form of an authoriza-
tion to speak for the entire Union (subject to approval from Brussels); as well 
as the role to co-ordinate the work of the member states’ bilateral missions. 
Prominent exclusions among those 54 delegations were those to international 
bodies such as the UN in New York or the OSCE in Vienna, since the Union 
still had to work out how to handle EU representation in multilateral forums 
under Lisbon.34 however, it is certainly the EU’s ambition to ‘progressively’ 
expand these powers to other EU delegations as well.35 This process can be 
followed in the regular reports on ‘EU Diplomatic Representation in third coun-
tries’ published by the Policy Coordination Division of the EEAS, and has been 
recently evaluated in the December 2011 report on one year of EEAS. The 
latter report states that EU delegations ‘have progressively taken over the re-
Release of the EU delegation to the United States ‘New EU Ambassador presents his creden-
tials’, EU/NR 35/10, 10 August 2012. See also f. fenton, ‘EU Ambassadors: A New Creed?’, in 
Paul Quinn (ed.), Making European Diplomacy Work: Can the EEAS Deliver?, College of Europe, 
EU Diplomacy Paper, 8/2011at 26-30.
31 European Council, the President, ‘Presentation of letters of credentials to President Van 
Rompuy’, EUCO 9/12, Brussels, 18 January 2012. here President Van Rompuy received the 
credentials of the Ambassadors of Saudi Arabia, Rwanda, fYROM, Malaysia, Colombia, Peru, 
Turkey and Afghanistan.
32 This is the latest number including the two newly opened delegations in Libya and the 
South Sudan.
33 Andrew Rettman, ‘EU commission ‘embassies’ granted new powers’, EU Observer, 21 
January 2010.
34 Ibid. Similarly, Andrew Rettman, ‘Ashton designates six new ‘strategic partners’, quoting an 
EU official on the importance of the EEAS for the role of Mrs. Ashton in external representation: 
“Lady Ashton has de facto 136 ambassadors at her disposal”, 16 September 2010.
35 See for example: EEAS, ‘EU diplomatic representation in third countries – second half of 
2011’, 11808/2/11 REV 2, Brussels, 25 November 2011, and EEAS, ‘EU diplomatic representation 
in third countries – first half of 2012’, 18975/11, Brussels, 22 December 2011. These documents 
always start with two paragraphs quoting Article 221 TfEU and an excerpt from the Swedish 
Presidency report on the EEAS of 23 October 2009, which set out the Member States’ view on 
the scope of the EEAS in relation to the hR mandate. On that basis these reports continue by 
stating that the ‘responsibility of representation and coordination on behalf of the EU has been 
performed by a number of Union delegations as of 1 January 2010, or later’, and insofar as they 
have not taken over such functions, pre-Lisbon arrangements and the role of the Presidency 
continue to apply.
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sponsibilities held by the rotating presidency for the co-ordination of EU posi-
tions and demarches’.36 The report adds that this evolution has been a ‘mixed 
success’. It argues that the transition ‘has gone remarkably smoothly in bilat-
eral delegations and has been welcomed by third countries’, though other re-
ports are cautious.37 As regards EU representation at international organizations, 
the EEAS evaluation report states that ‘the situation has in general been more 
challenging in multilateral delegations … given the greater complexity of legal 
and competence issues.’38 
Indeed, the unified diplomatic presence for the EU in multilateral fora post-
Lisbon has so far proven highly problematic, in spite of the TfEU’s specific 
legal obligation in its Article 220 (1) TfEU. This provision requires that the EU 
‘shall establish all appropriate forms of cooperation’ with various international 
organisations including, but not limited to (Article 220 (2) TfEU), the UN, the 
Council of Europe, the OSCE and the OECD. On the basis of this provision, 
the Union has already begun to implement its ambitions in terms of presence 
in multilateral fora.39 The saga of speaking rights at the UN General Assembly 
and EU participation in the UN concluded in May 2011 is well known.40 There 
is thus no need to dwell further on this example, and in this contribution we 
look at evolutions from the second half of 2011. In the following subsection 3.2 
we shall look at the dispute concerning EU legal personality and formal pres-
ence in multilateral fora on the Member States’ presence, with the Interna-
tional Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) as a specific example.
3.2. delivery of EU demarches on behalf of the EU and/or its member 
states
With the EU wishing to establish its unified substantive diplomatic presence in 
multilateral fora, for some Member States – the UK notably – it has become 
problematic that the EU’s legal personality is now explicitly recognised by the 
Treaty (Article 47 TEU) Indeed, with the Lisbon Treaty, the European Com-
munity (EC) has ceased to exist (Article 1 TfEU), and is now replaced by the 
36 European External Action Service, ‘Report by the high Representative to the European 
Parliament, the Council and the Commission’, 22 December 2011, at 6.
37 Ibid. at 7. Kaczynski reports that there have been problems there too: in Washington, some 
national ambassadors apparently did not show up for local coordination meetings for months 
P. M. Kaczynski, ‘Swimming in Murky Waters: Challenges in Developing the EU’s External Rep-
resentation’, FII Briefing Paper 88, September 2011, at 9.
38 European External Action Service, ‘Report by the high Representative to the European 
Parliament, the Council and the Commission’, 22 December 2011, at 8.
39 As regards the Council of Europe, Art. 6(2) states that the Union shall accede to the Eu-
ropean Convention on human Rights, a negotiation process which was nearly completed at the 
time of writing, January 2012.
40 The EU first sought to upgrade its observer status at the United Nations at the UNGA 
meeting in September 2010, but after a much publicised failure only managed to do so by May 
2011. See Catherine Ashton, ’Statement by the high Representative following her call with UN 
Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon’, A 162/10, Brussels 18 August 2010, and Catherine Ashton, 
’Statement by the high Representative on the adoption of the UN General Assembly Resolution 
on the EU’s participation in the work of the UN’, A 172/11, Brussels, 3 May 2011.
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European Union which possesses legal personality. (See Article 1 io 47 TEU). 
While prior to the Lisbon Treaty the EU did already conclude many interna-
tional agreements and could thus be argued to possess implicit legal personality,41 
the ‘politically constructive ambiguity’ of ‘European Union’ allowed this label to 
function as a political umbrella term referring to the EC and its 27 Member 
States. The fact that now Article 47 TEU explicitly gives legal personality to the 
EU, has prompted the UK to deploy the rather legal-formalistic argument that 
the terminology ‘EU’ can no longer be utilized to designate ‘EC and its Member 
States’ when delivering statements on behalf of the EU in multilateral fora.42 
The UK argues that because the Union’s legal personality has explicitly been 
recognized, ‘EU’ has become a purely legal concept. Therefore, it allegedly 
can no longer serve to represent areas covered both by EU and Member States 
competences as that might lead to competence creep to the Union. 
The Commission and several Member States strongly opposed this reason-
ing, which led to ‘EU’ representation in multilateral fora such as at the OSCE 
and UN to ground to a halt during the second half of 2011. During that time, 
several dozen EU statements and demarches were blocked over deep disa-
greement as to who delivers the statement: ‘the European Union’ or ‘the Eu-
ropean Union and its Member States’.43 A temporary cease-fire, though not a 
permanent solution, was agreed on 24 October 2011 in the form of a document 
entitled ‘general arrangements for EU statements’44 Through this document the 
EU wishes to keep competence battles ‘internal and consensual’45 so that the 
EU achieve ‘coherent, comprehensive and unified external representation’ in 
multilateral organisations. however, the time and effort spent on minutiae in 
Council Conclusions no less – (‘EU representation will be exercised from behind 
an EU nameplate’46) show how difficult to reach the ambition for the EU as a 
diplomatic actor exhibiting these three qualities still is. Notably, the arrangement 
expresses a rather rigid interpretation of ‘international unity’ focusing on form 
rather than substance. This because it requires that each statement made in 
a multilateral organisation requires tracing who is competent for which area, 
and to ensure that the internal division of competences is adequately reflected 
externally, namely on the statement’s cover page and in the body of the text. 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the exact arrangements as to 
when a statement should say ‘on behalf of EU’, or ‘on behalf of the EU and its 
Member States’,47 though it is truistic to state that such is hardly the core-
business of multilateral diplomacy – the substance of the single message being 
of central importance. What is then notable in light of the single message is 
that even when there is agreement that the EU shall present a statement on 
41 See note 8.
42 Discussion with senior official from a Member State, November 2011.
43 See S. Blockmans, ‘The European External Action Service One Year On: first signs of 
strengths and weaknesses’, CLEER Working Paper 2012/2, at 33.
44 Council of the European Union, ‘General Arrangements for EU Statements in Multilateral 
Organisations’, 16901/11, Brussels, 24 October 2011.
45 Ibid. at 2.
46 Ibid. at 3.
47 Ibid. at 3.
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its own behalf, according to the arrangement, still, ‘Member States may com-
plement statements made on behalf of the EU whilst respecting the principle 
of sincere cooperation.’48 This statement is rather troubling diplomatically and 
legally: diplomatically, the utility of a Member State also taking the microphone 
to repeat what the EU delegate has just said (since the duty of cooperation in 
Article 4 (3) TEU would not allow that Member State to say anything that con-
travenes it), seems rather futile. In international diplomacy one may certainly 
consider it useful that specific Member States with specific skills, knowledge, 
or historically good diplomatic relations ‘back up’ EU action, though this is not 
what is envisaged by this arrangement: it concretely implies that Member States 
should still be allowed to repeat the same message of the Union, largely for 
the visibility of their own foreign ministers. Legally too, the duty of cooperation 
entails from the Member States that they respect ‘the EU institutional process’ 
and accept that their interests be defended ’through the Union’ as a conse-
quence of their EU membership.49 In fact, when the EU has decided to act 
internationally, in many cases this will actually entail a ‘duty to remain silent’ 
on the part of the Member States, even in the area of shared competences.50 
Thus, the arrangement rather goes against pre-existing legal interpretations of 
shared competence and the duty of cooperation, and seems hardly conducive 
to the unified diplomatic actor in substance, the Lisbon Treaty and EEAS sought 
to create. 
One example may further illustrate the concrete impact of this rigid interpre-
tation of Union competence and legal personality from the perspective of unified 
diplomatic representation. On 22 february 2012, the Council adopted a Deci-
sion concluding the ‘Memorandum of Cooperation between the European Un-
ion and the International Civil Aviation Organisation providing a framework for 
enhanced cooperation, and laying down procedural arrangements related 
thereto.’51 The Commission had proposed the negotiation of this Memorandum 
in June 2009, and it was authorized to do so by the Transport Council in De-
cember 2009. The final document was initialled in September 2010. The purpose 
of this document is to ensure deep EU involvement in a multilateral organiza-
tion of which it is not a member, but where it has significant competences. In 
essence it deals with the situation at issue in Opinion 2/91, where the CJEU 
has decided that due to absence of EU membership in the International Labour 
Organization, the Member States owed a close duty of cooperation to the 
Union so to ensure adequate representation of the common ‘Union interest’.52 
48 Ibid. at 3.
49 Opinion of Advocate General Maduro, Case C-246/07, Commission v Sweden Stockholm 
Convention on persistent organic pollutants (PFOS) [2009] Judgment of 20 April 2010, not yet 
reported, paras. 49 and 56.
50 A. Delgado Casteleiro and J. Larik, ‘The Duty to Remain Silent: Limitless Loyalty in EU 
External Relations’, European Law Review (2011) 522-539.
51 Council Decision on the conclusion of a memorandum of Cooperation between the Euro-
pean Union and the International Civil Aviation Organisation providing a framework for enhanced 
cooperation, and laying down procedural arrangements related thereto, DOC 5560/12, Brussels, 
22 february 2012.
52 R. holdgaard, ‘The European Community’s Implied External Competence after the Open 
Skies cases’, 8 European Foreign Affairs Review (2003), at 365-394; European Commission, 
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There should be no doubt that the Union has a strong legal and political inter-
est to be represented in a singular fashion before the ICAO. Through the 
completion of the internal aviation market by the mid-nineties, as confirmed by 
the Open Skies judgments of 2002, many of the aspects on civil aviation cov-
ered by the 1944 Chicago Convention (safety, security, environment and air 
traffic management) fall within the scope of EU competence through the ap-
plication of the ERTA doctrine.53 In keeping with this reality, the EU-ICAO 
memorandum essentially sets out a regime of closer cooperation through the 
reciprocal participation in EU and ICAO consultative processes, joint mecha-
nisms for regular dialogue, information sharing through databases, and so on. 
from the perspective of the EU Member States, supporting the EU in achieving 
its Treaty objectives through such a Memorandum in an organization of which 
it is not a member, is indubitably an expression of their duty of loyalty towards 
the Union embedded in Article 4 (3) TEU.54 The response of the United Kingdom 
was the following:
‘The UK will be abstaining on the Decision on Conclusion of a Memorandum of 
Cooperation between the European Union and the International Civil Aviation Or-
ganisation. The UK recognises the benefits of the Memorandum of Cooperation, but 
attaches great importance to the principle of Member State sovereignty in interna-
tional organisations. The UK is cautious about any measures and processes which 
could eventually lead to a change of the distribution of competences between the 
EU and Member States. We would wish to convey these concerns by abstaining on 
this Decision.”55 (emphasis added)
The UK had previously mulled a negative vote, but then decided that abstention 
would suffice to make their point. In any case, since the legal basis of this 
Council Decision is Articles 100 (2) io. 218 (6) TfEU, the Council adopts this 
decision by qualified majority and the adoption of the Memorandum was not 
blocked. however, it points to a road in EU external representation post-Lisbon 
which ought not to be taken. A close look at the substance of the Memorandum 
of Cooperation shows that it is ‘procedural’ in nature, by establishing forms of 
closer cooperation between the EU and the ICAO in areas where it already 
possesses competence. It thus does not ‘expand’ EU competence in scope or 
substance, and one might query what would be the on-the-ground conse-
quences of this ‘abstention’ – read together with the general arrangement on 
external representation? In application of QMV it is normal that certain Member 
States may be outvoted, but the explicit adoption of this statement cannot be 
permitted to have any further consequences. Indeed, the UK remains bound 
by the duty to cooperate loyalty embedded in Article 4 (3) TEU: ‘The Member 
‘Proposal for a Council Decision on the conclusion of a memorandum of Cooperation between 
the EU and the ICAO’, Explanatory Memorandum, COM(2011) 107 final, Brussels, 10 March 
2011, at 2.
53 holdgaard, op. cit
54 Opinion 2/91, ‘Convention No 170 ILO on the safety in the use of chemicals at work’, [1993] 
ECR I-1061.
55 Council Decision of 22 february 2012, supra n. 51 at 3.
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States shall facilitate the achievement of the Union’s tasks and refrain from any 
measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s objectives.’ Thus, 
in practice the UK must actively support EU activities in Montréal to implement 
this Memorandum of cooperation, and may not undertake any action that would 
hamper its implementation. Time must now tell whether that will be the case, 
but the blockage of EU presence in other multilateral fora in 2011 does not 
bode well.
3.3. diplomatic visits by top EU political representatives: separate 
roles of the EEas, EU delegations and the Commission
The issue of competence as a challenge to the EU’s effective, coherent and 
visible global representation is equally exemplified by the procedures relating 
to visits, missions and meetings of the Commissioners or the high Repre-
sentative with third countries and international organisations – part and parcel 
of international diplomacy. The decision on the need for such visits, their prep-
aration as well as their execution is rather complex within the Union, due to the 
co-existence of many ‘high level political faces’ of the Union. Post-Lisbon, ad-
ditional complexity is created by the co-existence of the Commission and EEAS 
which each possess their own international relations responsibilities (Articles 
17 and 27 io. 18 TEU). In January 2012 the EEAS and Commission therefore 
agreed a ‘working arrangement’ in implementation of Articles 3 (3) and 4 (5) of 
the EEAS Council Decision,56 which duly illustrates the coordinative challeng-
es of having two distinct actors with a significant and similar role in the single 
diplomatic task of external representation at the highest political levels. In legal 
terms, the procedures agreed in case of such visits are the expression of the 
duty of cooperation embedded in Articles 4 (3), 13 (2) and 24 TEU, as explic-
itly reiterated in Article 3 (2) of the EEAS Council Decision.57 We briefly quote 
the latter article, as it is useful to examine to which extent the Working Arrange-
ment implements or respects this article: 
‘The EEAS and the services of the Commission shall consult each other on all mat-
ters relating to the external action of the Union in the exercise of their respective 
functions, except on matters covered by the CSDP. The EEAS shall take part in the 
preparatory work and procedures relating to acts to be prepared by the Commission 
in this area.’58 
The Working arrangement’s rules on cooperation in the case of visits and mis-
sions are set out in four paragraphs, which respectively deal with: 
56 European Commission, Secretariat General, Working Arrangements between Commission 
Services and the European External Action Service (EEAS) in relation to external relations is-
sues, SEC (2012) 48, unpublished, on file with authors, at 4, hereafter: Working Arrangement.
57 B. Van Vooren, ‘A legal-institutional perspective on the European External Action Service’, 
48 Common Market Law Review (2011)), 475-502, at 496-498. 
58 Council Decision 2010/427/EU of 26 July 2010 establishing the organisation and function-
ing of the European External Action Service, OJ 2010 L 201/30.
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1) Ensuring that relevant EEAS and Commission services are properly in-
formed about planned visits and missions.
2) Establishing the role of EU Delegations in such visits.
3) Establishing the role of the EEAS and the Commission in visits of com-
missioners and the hR/VP’s visits and missions.
4) Establishing competence boundaries for the EEAS and Commission of-
ficials in multilateral contexts during such visits.
The first point is that of intra-EU information about impending visits. Namely, 
when a Commissioner will visit a third country or international organization, the 
relevant Commission services ‘shall inform’ the EU delegation and the EEAS 
country desk of such a visit for which they are responsible.59 This paragraph 
of the working arrangement does not contain reciprocity however, and thus the 
EEAS must not inform Commission services of visits by the hR/VP. This is no 
coincidental omission, as that same first paragraph does state that ‘information 
about the hR/VP’s and Commissioners’ missions shall also be communicated 
to [the Secretariat General, Directorate f3 on relations with the EEAS] which 
is maintaining a strategic planning calendar of missions and meetings.’ We 
may of course query whether reciprocity in this regard would even be neces-
sary, given her CfSP focus? Taking the example of Palestine, in which the hR/
VP has taken a great personal interest and which she visits regularly, the util-
ity of reciprocal information to and from DG DEVCO is rather truistic.60 Undoubt-
edly, in practice, Commission development staff would come to know about 
such visits through staff at relevant EU delegations, the internal calendar, or 
other day-to-day contacts, but the formal absence of reciprocity in the Working 
Arrangement is nevertheless telling of ‘competence sensitivities’. Ad hoc co-
operation may take place, but at the principled, written level, the Arrangement 
reflects that the EEAS’ personnel, a structure set up on a legal basis within the 
TEU’s articles on CfSP,61 ought not inform Commission services of missions 
conducted by its top brass. 
The second paragraph of the Working Arrangement focuses specifically on 
EU Delegations stating that they ‘will provide all necessary support for the 
organisation of visits or missions to the countries or IO’s for which they are 
responsible. They should be consulted in advance on the aim, content and 
timeliness of visits/and or demarches.’ These consultations are indeed crucial, 
and in this case, silence is golden: the Working Arrangement does not state 
for whose visits they should be consulted upon – which is positive. On the 
basis of the EEAS’ tasks as described in Article 2 of the EEAS Decision, we 
can thus assume that it concerns both Commissioners, the hR/VP, but also 
the President of the European Council. from the perspective of diplomatic 
ambitions, the working Arrangement is then laudable as it gives a rather broad 
59 Working Arrangement, at 4.
60 See for example: Statement by high Representative Catherine Ashton following her 
meeting with the President of the Palestinian Authority, Mahboud Abbas, A 514/11, Brussels, 
14 December 2011.
61 Art. 27(3) TEU.
71
External representation and the EEAS: Selected legal challenges
CLEER WORKING PAPERS 2012/5
’embassy’-like role to the EU delegations. In national contexts too, an em-
bassy will indeed be in close consultation with headquarters on the timeliness, 
form, level and content of a visit to the third country or IO in light of current and 
future diplomatic relations. As and when the visit takes place, that embassy will 
put much effort in meticulously preparing a visit by its foreign (or prime) minis-
ter through an hour-by-hour calendar of the meetings, discussions etc. by the 
high official.62 The fact that this second paragraph is formulated ‘in the abstract’ 
is then arguably significant: no reference to specific competence-related limita-
tions. EU delegations are quite simply expected to act as the proverbial one-
stop-shop with important influence on visits and missions by EU representatives.
In paragraph 3, the Working Arrangement gets more complex (or at least, 
meticulous) when it comes to preparing the briefings of the visitor to the third 
country or IO. here the Arrangement refers not to ‘EU delegations’ but rather 
to the more generic EEAS – which implies that this paragraph pertains to staff 
at headquarters based in Brussels, and again institutional competences and 
division do matter. Nonetheless, the notion of reciprocal cooperation of Article 
3 (2) EEAS Council Decision does permeate this paragraph. The basic princi-
ple is that ‘the EEAS will contribute to briefings for Commissioners’ visits to 
third countries’, and equally that ’Commission services will contribute to brief-
ings for the hR/VP’s visits’ – with specific arrangements for briefings for can-
didate countries. Thus, the EEAS and Commission should together write the 
document the visiting official will read on the plane-ride to her or his destination. 
however, when it comes to meeting with the Commissioner or hR/VP, staff of 
‘the other’ institution will not necessarily be present: ‘Where appropriate, the 
relevant Commission service(s) and the EEAS will participate in preparatory 
meetings with the Commissioner(s). Where appropriate, the relevant Commis-
sion service(s) will participate in preparatory meetings with the hR/VP.’63 Em-
pirical research would be required what exactly ‘where appropriate’ means in 
this context, but past from experience in the field of EU external relations one 
might be suspicious of such phrases. In a sceptical reading, it may imply room 
for turf battles over the appropriateness of attending meetings with top politi-
cians of the other institution, though in a more benevolent reading it may sim-
ply imply that when the EEAS has forwarded some documents to the 
Commission in preparing a visit by for example the Trade Commissioner, there 
is no need to attend the preparation meeting prior to the visit. Indeed, a Work-
ing Arrangement at this level must leave room for what EEAS Managing Direc-
tor Christian Leffler rightly calls ‘common sense’:64 Only when it is useful should 
staff be present in the work of the other institution, and the Working Arrange-
ment reflects the same sentiment when it comes to making the journey itself. 
Where appropriate, ‘Commission staff may be asked to accompany the hR/
62 These perhaps slightly generic observations are based on the time spent by one of the 
authors at the Belgian Permanent Representation to the United Nations, and the work of its staff 
preparing a visit of its foreign minister to New York.
63 Working Arrangement, at 4.
64 C. Leffler, in response to a question posed by one of the authors on EEAS diplomatic re-
porting obligations, at the conference ‘Evaluating the Diplomatic System of the European Union’, 
Brussels, 28 february 2012.
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VP on visits. Similarly EEAS staff may be asked to accompany Commissioners 
on visits.’65 
finally, the Working Arrangement states that ‘[i]n accordance with Article 
221 TfEU, EU Delegations in third countries and at international organisations 
represent the EU. Where the relevant Commissioner participates in meetings, 
conferences or negotiations related to international organisations, conventions 
and/or agreements, he/she will represent the EU position in non-CfSP matters. 
In meetings at official level, the non-CfSP EU position can be presented either 
by the EU Delegation or by Commission officials.’66 That the high Representa-
tive speaks in CfSP matters and Commissioners in non-CfSP matters is no 
surprise,67 but the sentence on meetings at ‘official level’ is perhaps more puz-
zling. This sentence concerns representation by the EU institutions in multilat-
eral contexts such as the United Nations and the OSCE. Let us draw the 
parallel with national diplomatic activities: It is certainly not exceptional that 
diplomatic staff of a Member State to the United Nations would be joined by 
experts from national ministries (foreign ministry, agriculture, development, etc) 
on topical issues such as for example ECOSOC meetings. however, the work-
ing arrangement does not speak of EEAS officials from Brussels (EU equivalent 
of a national foreign ministry) and Commission officials (the ‘other’ ministries) 
presenting the non-CfSP EU position aside from the EU delegation, but only 
of the latter category. here too, we can have two interpretations: the ‘common 
sense’-interpretation implies that this simply replicates the situation of national 
experts joining their diplomats at the permanent representation in New York. 
however, the more ‘suspicious’ interpretation would be that this sentence is an 
extension of Article 17 (1) TEU, which is an article on which the Commission 
has been placing much emphasis in the post-Lisbon era. It reads: ‘With the 
exception of the common foreign and security policy, and other cases provided 
for in the Treaties, [the Commission] shall ensure the Union’s external repre-
sentation.’ Thus, if this sentence in the Working Arrangement indeed means 
that the Commission shall ensure external representation alongside with, or 
instead of the EU delegations, this certainly detracts from the EU’s ambition 
for them to be the “one stop shop” for EU diplomacy and external representa-
tion. This is especially so if it means that EU delegations are thus still associ-
ated with the task of representing the EU only on ‘CfSP issues’, something 
which Article 221 TfEU expressly seeks to avoid. 
We may thus conclude that on the point of visits and missions by high officials 
the Working Arrangement leaves room for an optimistic reading and a more 
sceptical reading. On the one hand they do establish a set of rules which 
accord to “common sense” in the organization of diplomatic visits, but they do 
so in a charged environment where competence struggles are never far away, 
and which leave room for tension between the many ‘high level’ political rep-
resentatives of the Union.
65 Ibid. at 4.
66 Ibid. at 4.
67 Art. 40 TEU.
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3.4. Rules pertaining to the information-gathering and reporting tasks 
of the EU delegations
The fourth indent of Article 3 VCDR states as one of the diplomatic activities 
of a state: ‘Ascertaining by all lawful means conditions and developments in 
the receiving State, and reporting thereon to the Government of the sending 
State’.68 There should be no doubt that ‘diplomatic reporting’ is a core business 
for the EU delegations. In this subsection, we shall look specifically at the ‘lines 
of diplomatic reporting to headquarters’ by EU Delegations, headquarters be-
ing the EEAS and Commission services in Brussels. Related to that, given the 
structure of the Union as an international actor, we must also briefly reflect on 
information-sharing between the EU delegations and Member State Delega-
tions on-the-ground. We have already seen that between the EEAS and the 
Commission the duty of cooperation exists in a reciprocal fashion; which is 
however not the case between EU delegations and the Member States. Article 
5 (9) of the EEAS Council Decision states that ‘The Union delegations shall 
work in close cooperation and share information with the diplomatic services 
of the Member States.’ Notably, an early draft version of that article read ‘on a 
reciprocal basis’. however, this was omitted during the negotiations on the 
Council Decision, which is indeed potentially problematic.69
Looking first at the EEAS-Commission relationship, we must again look at 
the Working Arrangement of January 2012. This document contains the follow-
ing agreement on reporting back to ‘headquarters’: ‘EU Delegations shall pro-
vide political reporting to the hR/VP, President Barroso and relevant 
Commissioner(s), the EEAS and Commission services … A two way flow of 
information is essential – from the political and trade/economic sections of EU 
Delegations to the EEAS and Commission services and in the opposite direc-
tion. The geographical desks in the EEAS shall be systematically copied on all 
reports and information relative to her/his respective country. Delegations shall 
provide relevant reporting to other Commission services outside the external 
relations “family”. The Commission services shall keep EU Delegations informed 
about relevant developments, providing lines to take etc.’70 Specifically as re-
gards multilateral organisations, the Working Arrangement states that ‘EU Del-
egations will report to both the EEAS and the relevant Commission DG(s)/
services as appropriate. These Delegations may establish specific direct lines 
of reporting with the relevant Commission DG(s)/services in charge of the is-
sues and policies dealt with (e.g. development, trade, economic issues, etc); 
systematically copying the EEAS. Reporting should, if relevant, also cover is-
sues of a general nature concerning the international organisation in question.’71 
68 Art. 3(c) and (d) VCDR.
69 B. Van Vooren, ‘A legal-institutional perspective on the European External Action Service’, 
48 Common Market Law Review (2011) 475-502, at 497. here the author submits that although 
Article 5 (9) omits the reference to reciprocal EU-Member State cooperation, Article 4 (3) TEU 
still applies, and such a duty can be said to exist regardless of its absence in the EEAS Council 
Decision.
70 Ibid. at 3.
71 Ibid. at 4.
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This seems to be a rather sensible arrangement, both as regards the bi-
directionality of reporting and the lines of reporting via the EEAS or directly to 
the Commission. Asked about what these obligations mean in practice, EEAS 
Managing Director Leffler gave the example of discussions on the Rio+20 
meeting in June 2012. Reporting there would go from the EU delegation in 
Brazil to DG CLIMA, DG ENV and DG TRADE in the Commission, to the 2 
offices of the Commission and European Council Presidents, to the regional 
desk of the EEAS and to the local Member State representations. As in the 
previous subsection, the common sense (or optimistic) interpretation must be 
contrasted with the more sceptical perspective. One can indeed argue that 
setting up ad hoc lines of reporting, and a great degree of leeway must be ac-
corded to individual EU delegations as regards reporting, as they must be able 
to take into account specific circumstances. however, since information is the 
bread and butter of coherent and effective policy-making, it is important to have 
a common, high standard of unified reporting between all relevant actors of EU 
diplomacy, and this is currently not yet the case. Indeed, it has been reported 
that policy reporting varied greatly in quality, and suffered from ‘ad hoc-ism’ 
depending on the Delegation at issue. Bicchi’s extensive empirical research of 
the period up to Autumn 2011 shows that in the first year of the EEAS’s exist-
ence ‘there has been disparity between delegations in the way that reports are 
drafted and shared, as some delegations are more inclusive and/or descriptive 
than others.’72 That is certainly undesirable in light of external delegations’ prime 
role in swiftly and effectively collecting and disseminating information on-the-
ground. however, this is not something which could be solved by further teas-
ing out the text in the EEAS-Commission Working Arrangement. Rather, it is a 
matter of management by the heads of Delegations who ensure that reporting 
is in line with the common agreement in Brussels. According to Leffler, the 
challenge of political reporting is less one between the institutions themselves, 
but rather one between the EU delegations and the Member States. According 
to him, at present (february 2012) the Member States are mainly on the receiv-
ing end of EU delegations’ report, but share very little the other way. There is 
the hope and expectation that this will change, as Member States external 
representations come to trust and get used to their EU counterparts. One pilot 
project has been set up in Washington, to ensure greater cooperation in line 
with Article 5 (8) of the EEAS Council Decision: here political reports are up-
loaded through a shared intra-website, which can then be downloaded by the 
EU delegation and the local Member State representations.73
72 f. Bicchi, ‘The European External Action Service: A Pivotal Actor in EU foreign Policy Com-
munications’, 7 The Hague Journal of Diplomacy (2012), at 90.
73 C. Leffler, in response to a question posed by one of the authors on EEAS diplomatic re-
porting obligations, at the conference “Evaluating the Diplomatic System of the European Union”, 
Brussels, 28 february 2012.
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4. DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION AND CONSULAR ASSISTANCE fOR  
‘EU NATIONALS’ AND ThE REALITY Of INTERNATIONAL LAW
An important role for diplomatic missions abroad as described in Article 3 (1) 
VCDR is to ‘Protect the interests of the sending state and its nationals in the 
receiving state – within the limits permitted by international law’.74 There is a 
strong basis in the Treaties for EU ambitions on this front. Articles 3 (5) TEU 
and 23 TfEU together provide the basis for diplomatic protection and consular 
assistance to EU citizens. Article 3 (5) TEU obliges the EU to protect the inter-
ests of its citizens abroad, and persons holding the nationality of a Member 
State are citizens of the Union (Article 20 (1) TfEU). however, Member States 
are divided on how far the ambitions implementing these provisions would 
reach. In its most long-term version, if the Union were to achieve full diplo-
matic maturity, its most far-reaching implication might be that the EU provides 
such protection as if they were ‘nationals of the EU’ for the purposes of inter-
national law. While Article 3 (5) TEU could accommodate that interpretation, 
the role explicitly foreseen in the EEAS Decision for diplomatic protection and 
consular assistance by the EU does not, and is merely supplementary: ’The 
Union delegations shall, acting in accordance with the third paragraph of Article 
35 TEU, and upon request by Member States, support the Member States in 
their diplomatic relations and in their role of providing consular protection to 
citizens of the Union in third countries on a resource-neutral basis.’75 While one 
may argue that consular assistance thus is not a competence of the EEAS or 
the Union delegations per se, a role of the delegations in this area seems 
obvious and was already foreseen by the Commission prior to the entry into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty.76 At that point in time the Commission has been 
quite active in working together with the Member States in the protection of 
their citizens in crisis situations in third countries.77 In March 2011, the Com-
mission published a state-of-play on this issue, where it argued that ’the need 
of EU citizens for consular protection is expected to increase in the coming 
years.’ 78 To support that argument the Commission first quoted Eurostat num-
bers which show a steep upwards trend in EU citizens travelling to third coun-
tries: from 80 million trips in 2005 to 90 million trips in 2008. The Commission 
also referred to major recent crises which affected a considerable number of 
EU citizens: Libya, Egypt and Bahrain after the uprisings in spring 2011, Japan 
after the earthquake in March 2011, or Iceland’s volcanic ash cloud in spring 
2010. In these circumstances, the Commission argued that ’it appears particu-
larly relevant to further reinforce the effectiveness of the right of EU citizens to 
74 Art. 3(b) VCDR.
75 Art. 5(10) of the EEAS Decision.
76 See ‘Effective consular protection in third countries: the contribution of the European Un-
ion’, European Commission Action Plan 2007-2009, COM (2007) 767 final, at 10: “In the longer 
term, the Commission will also consider the possibility of obtaining the consent of third countries 
to allow the Union to exercise its protection through the Commission delegations”.
77 See ‘Consular protection for EU citizens in third countries: State of play and way forward’, 
Commission Communication, COM-2011, 23 March 2011, 149 final, section 2.3.
78 Ibid.
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be assisted in third countries for their different needs (e.g. practical support, 
health or transport). With public budgets under pressure, the European Union 
and the Member States need to foster cooperation to optimise the effective use 
of resources.’ 79 however, the EU Member States are deeply divided on how 
far EU ambitions reach in this area, and what is the end-point of ‘optimisation 
of resources’? Some Member States have a strong interest for EU Delegations 
to develop a capacity for consular support for EU citizens, whereas others are 
clearly opposed to the EU taking such a role, since they see this as a purely 
national competence.80 What is certain from the perspective of the EEAS is 
that if the Union wishes to pursue such a role for EU delegations abroad, sig-
nificantly more financial and human resources will need to be allocated to the 
EU diplomatic service. The December 2011 EEAS evaluation report stated that 
‘it is difficult to see how this objective could reasonably be achieved “on a re-
source neutral basis” as required by the EEAS decision. It would certainly not 
be responsible to raise citizens’ expectations about the services to be provided 
by EU delegations, beyond their capacity to deliver in such a sensitive area. 
And the existing expertise within the EEAS in this area is extremely limited. 
however, over the past year we have also seen that the EU Delegations can 
play an important role in the coordination of evacuations of citizens and that 
pragmatic solutions can be found on the ground.’
In keeping with the forward-looking nature of the article, we will examine the 
possibly most-far-reaching implications of EU citizenship. Namely, the ECJ has 
stated that this is a ’fundamental status’ of nationals of the member states. We 
interpret that as meaning that for the purposes of diplomatic protection and/or 
consular assistance, EU citizens could be considered – if not now than in the 
medium or long term – as ‘EU nationals’. On that basis we then investigate the 
extent to which international diplomatic law is currently capable of accommo-
dating ‘EU nationals’, e.g. nationals of an IO rather than of a sovereign nation, 
in their diplomatic, or consular needs.
International law generally makes a distinction between consular assistance 
and diplomatic protection. Diplomatic protection ‘consists of the invocation by 
a State, through diplomatic action or other means of peaceful settlement, of 
the responsibility of another State for an injury caused by an internationally 
wrongful act of that State to a natural or legal person that is a national of the 
former State with a view to the implementation of such responsibility.’ (Art. 1 of 
the 2006 Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection). It is often considered to involve 
judicial proceedings, but protection of citizens may take different shapes, in-
cluding the forceful protection by military missions.81 Interventions outside the 
judicial process on behalf of nationals (issuing passports, assisting in transna-
tional marriages, etc.) are generally not regarded as constituting diplomatic 
79 Ibid.
80 European External Action Service, ‘Report by the high Representative to the European 
Parliament, the Council and the Commission’, 22 December 2011, at 7-8.
81 See for an example J. Larik, ‘Operation Atalanta and the Protection of EU Citizens: Civis 
Europaeus Unheeded?’, in J. Larik and M. Moraru (eds.), ’Ever-Closer in Brussels – Ever-closer 
in the world? EU External Action after the Lisbon Treaty’, EUI Working Paper LAW 2011/10 107-
124, at 129-144.
77
External representation and the EEAS: Selected legal challenges
CLEER WORKING PAPERS 2012/5
protection but as falling under consular assistance.82 for EU citizens consular 
assistance is mostly what they seek whenever they are in a third country and 
in need of some administrative actions, both in peace time and in crisis situa-
tions.83 Diplomatic protection may come up when they run into legal troubles 
and a governmental intervention is requested. Diplomatic asylum relates to 
situations in which third country nationals seek the protection of a foreign em-
bassy. for the purpose of this paper it is not necessary to discuss the details 
of the distinction as we mainly aim to point to a general development, which 
indicates that the EU is increasingly involved in taking up these state functions.
We seem to be at the start of a new development, which calls for a reas-
sessment of the applicability of existing rules. Is it at all possible for the EU to 
play a state-like role in these matters? With the entry into force of the Maastricht 
Treaty in 1993, a European Citizenship was created, and the European Court 
of Justice even hinted at the idea of European citizenship being the primary 
identity of the nationals of the Member States.84 On the basis of Article 23 
TfEU, EU citizens are entitled to protection by the diplomatic and consular 
authorities of all Member States, when his/her own country has no represen-
tation.85 The experiences since 1993 are somewhat mixed. ‘[…] some States 
consider that very little has changed since the adoption of this provision, while 
others are more enthusiastic about it […]”’86 This may be related to the some-
what ambiguous phrasing of Article 23, which regulates the protection of EU 
citizens by the diplomatic missions of other Member States. It has been noted 
that Article 23 merely reflects a non-discrimination clause as it basically states 
that protection is to be provided ‘on the same conditions as the nationals of 
that state’. At the same time, the conclusion of international agreements is 
foreseen on the basis of which third states can accept protection and assist-
ance by an EU Member State on behalf of nationals of another EU Member 
State. This practice has hardly been followed.87 The fact is that, partly apart 
from the treaty provisions, the EU itself seems to be well on its way to further 
develop its capacities in the area of consular assistance. As an answer to the 
differences between the 27 national legal frameworks on consular and diplo-
matic protection, a common EU legal framework may be developed.88 There 
82 See A. Künzli, ‘Exercising Diplomatic Protection The fine Line Between Litigation, 
Demarches and Consular Assistance’, ZaöRV (2006) 321-350.
83 M. Lindström, ‘EU Consular Protection in Crisis Situations’, in S. Olsson (ed.), Crisis Man-
agement in the European Union: Cooperation in the Face of Emergencies, Berlin/heidelberg: 
Springer, 2009, at 109-126.
84 Case 184/99, Grzelczyk [2001] ECR I-6193. See more generally on European citizenship: 
J. Shaw, The Transformation of Citizenship in the European Union. Electoral Rights and the 
Restructuring of Political Space, Cambridge: CUP, 2007.
85 Art. 23 TfEU. Cf. also Art. 46 of the EU Charter.
86 See A. Vermeer-Künzli, ‘Where the Law Becomes Irrelevant: Consular Assistance and the 
European Union’, 60 ICLQ (2011) at 965-995.
87 Ibid. at 269-270.
88 The Commission hinted at new legislative measures in ‘Consular protection for EU citizens 
in third countries: State of play and way forward’, Commission Communication, COM(2011) 149 
final, at 13, 23 March 2011. See also M. Moraru, ‘The Protection of Citizens in the World: A legal 
Assessment of the EU Citizen’s Right to Protection Abroad’, in Larik and Moraru (eds.), ‘Ever-
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are good reasons to believe that this development may have consequences 
for the diplomatic services of the Member States and that traditional interna-
tional law is being sidestepped.89 In that sense, Article 23 itself already forms 
a good example of a deviation from general international law, as it provides for 
the right of EU citizens to diplomatic and consular protection of Member States 
other than the State of nationality in the territory of a third country.90
Indeed, one of the key problems is that the relevant international rules depart 
from the notion of ‘nationality’, defined as ‘the status of belonging to a state for 
certain purposes of international law’91 Indeed, ‘the criterion of nationality helps 
to recognise the entity that is both competent and accountable to act in the 
name of individuals vis-à-vis third countries.’92 Diplomatic protection is closely 
related to nationality as, in principle, states can only protect their own nationals. 
In a classic case in 1937, the Permanent Court of International Justice argued: 
“In taking up the case of one of its nationals […] a State is in reality exercising 
its own right […]. This right is necessarily limited to intervention on behalf of its 
own nationals because, in the absence of a special agreement, it is the bond 
of nationality between the State and the individual which alone confers upon 
the State the right of diplomatic protection”.93 While, this may be true for diplo-
matic protection, it may be easier for states to cooperate in consular matters, 
which are generally of a more administrative nature. In general, however, it is 
clear that ‒ irrespective of the invention of a ‘European Citizenship’‒ a ‘bond 
of nationality’ is by definition absent in the relationship between the EU and its 
citizens. European citizenship is granted to the nationals of the Member States 
(Article 20 TfEU).
In the academic debates on the scope of Article 23 TfEU the point is often 
made that this provision not only provides a right to EU citizens to consular 
protection, but also to diplomatic protection. Public international law academics 
would argue that it is in particular this dimension that cannot be established by 
the EU unilaterally, given the non-existence of the concept of ‘European na-
tionality’. In their view the essential ‘solid link’ between the intervening state 
and the protected citizen is missing. It has, however, been argued that the ILC 
Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection establish minimum standards under 
public international law which permits the States to go beyond these rules as 
long as they respect the condition of obtaining the express unanimous consent 
Closer in Brussels – Ever-Closer in the World? EU External Action after the Lisbon Treaty’, EUI 
Working Paper LAW 2011/10 107-124, at 118.
89 Vermeer-Künzli, ‘Where the Law Becomes Irrelevant: Consular Assistance and the Euro-
pean Union’, 60 ICLQ (2011 at. 965-995.
90 P. Vigni, ‘The Protection of EU Citizens: The Perspective of International Law’, in J. Larik 
and M. Moraru (eds.), ‘Ever-Closer in Brussels – Ever-Closer in the World? EU External Action 
after the Lisbon Treaty’, EUI Working Paper LAW 2011/10,, at 92 and 101-102.
91 Cf. Art. 3 VCDR and Art. 5 VCCR.
92 P. Vigni, ‘The Protection of EU Citizens: The Perspective of International Law’, in J. Larik 
and M. Moraru (eds.), ‘Ever-Closer in Brussels – Ever-Closer in the World? EU External Action 
after the Lisbon Treaty’, EUI Working Paper LAW 2011/10.
93 Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway Case, PCIJ Rep Series A/B No 76, at 16 (1934). Also in the 
Nottebohm Case (Second Phase) International Court of Justice Rep 4,22 (1955).
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of all the States involved in the new model (both EU Member States and (at 
least implicitly also by) third states).94
It is true that the general international rules apply ‘in the absence of a spe-
cial agreement’ and obviously states can simply agree to allow for the protec-
tion by states of non-nationals. In any case, under international law, the 
consular protection of a citizen by another State requires the consent of the 
receiving State (Art. 8 VCCR: ‘Upon appropriate notification to the receiving 
State, a consular post of the sending State may, unless the receiving State 
objects, exercise consular functions in the receiving State on behalf of a third 
State.’) Allowing the European Union to protect the nationals of its Member 
States would thus be a new step. As third states are not bound by EU law they 
will have to recognise European citizenship to allow the EU to protect or assist 
its citizens abroad.95 The EU does not yet have competences in this area, but 
the Commission has been quite clear on its ambitions: ‘[i]n the longer term, the 
Commission will also consider the possibility of obtaining the consent of third 
countries to allow the Union to exercise its protection through the Commission 
delegations’.96 Article 23 TfEU, which now only allows Member States to pro-
tect EU citizens with the nationality of another Member States, would then be 
a first step in a development towards the recognition of a role of the EU itself.97 
The current EEAS legal regime does not yet include this option and, obvi-
ously, any transfer of powers will depend on the consent of the Member States 
as well, as they may have good reasons to continue a bilateral representation. 
After all, essential elements of a relationship between a Member State and a 
third state may not be covered by the EU’s competences or a special relation-
ship may exist between an EU state and a third country, either due to historical 
ties and/or geographic location.98 Nevertheless, one medium-sized Member 
State already openly discussed the possible benefits of a transfer of certain 
consular tasks to Union delegations.99
94 See M. Moraru, ‘The Protection of Citizens in the World: A legal Assessment of the EU 
Citizen’s Right to Protection Abroad’, in Larik and Moraru (eds.), ‘Ever-Closer in Brussels – Ev-
er-Closer in the World? EU External Action after the Lisbon Treaty’, EUI Working Paper LAW 
2011/10 107-124, at 122.
95 P. Vigni, ‘Protection of EU Citizens: The Perspective of International Law’, in J. Larik and M. 
Moraru (eds.), ‘Ever-Closer in Brussels – Ever-Closer in the World? EU External Action after the 
Lisbon Treaty’, EUI Working Paper LAW 2011/10, at 92.
96 See ‘Effective Consular Protection in Third Countries: The Contribution of the European 
Union’, Commission Action Plan 2007-2009, COM (2007) 767 final, 5 December 2007, at 10. Cf. 
also M. Lindström ‘EU Consular Protection in Crisis Situations’, in S. Olsson (ed.), Crisis Man-
agement in the European Union: Cooperation in the Face of Emergencies, Berlin/heidelberg: 
Springer, 2009, at 112.
97 A. Ianniello Salicceti, ‘The Protection of EU Citizens Abroad: Accountability, Rule of Law, 
Role of Consular and Diplomatic Services’, European Public Law (2011) 91.
98 C. Cusens, ‘The EEAS vs. the National Embassies of EU Member States?’ in 
Paul Quinn (ed.), Making European Diplomacy Work: Can the EEAS Deliver?, College of Europe, 
EU Diplomacy Paper, 8/2011,at 12.
99 See the report by the Netherlands Ministry for foreign Affairs, ‘Nota modernisering Neder-
landse diplomatie’ 8 April 2011, at 10 and 18; available at <http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/document-
en-en-publicaties/notas/2011/04/08/nota-modernisering-nederlandse-diplomatie.html>.
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It is difficult to come up with cases in which the EU itself would have a rea-
son to protect EU citizens abroad. The Commission mentions the case in which 
EU citizens are not represented and may be in need of a ‘portal’ for further 
assistance.100 Another situation may be when the protection of an EU citizen 
is required on the basis of an agreement that was concluded between the EU 
and a third state.101 One may expect the Union delegations to play a role in 
these situations in the future, but the extent to which the delegations can actu-
ally take up diplomatic and consular tasks ultimately depends on agreements 
that are to be concluded with the third countries. It has been noted that Mem-
ber States will most probably not be too eager to hand over powers in this area 
to the EEAS. Yet, the European integration process has its own dynamic and 
Member States are also known to be pragmatic; coordination by the Union 
delegations and a foreseen harmonisation of the diverging rules on the protec-
tion of nationals102 may gradually lead to an increased role for the delegations 
in practice.
A final note concerns nationals of third states seeking diplomatic asylum by 
a Union delegation. Where diplomatic and consular protection is aimed at a 
state’ own nationals, diplomatic asylum may be requested by third country 
nationals in need of immediate protection. With the coming of age of the EU 
delegations and their visible presence all around the world in crisis situations, 
the question of whether the EU is allowed to grant diplomatic asylum becomes 
more apparent.
5. CONCLUSION: REALISTIC AMBITIONS OR DIPLOMATIC DREAMS?
The main aim of this paper was to confront the diplomatic ambitions of the 
EEAS with the reality of EU and international law. Treaty provisions as well as 
policy documents and statements of EU officials reveal a development in the 
direction of a strengthened role for the EU itself as a diplomatic actor. The 
establishment of the EEAS is often mentioned as a new and crucial phase in 
this development and ever more frequently one comes across terms like ‘EU 
Ambassador’ or ‘EU Embassy’. While Member States have a natural tendency 
to underline their sovereignty in international diplomatic relations, EU officials 
may point to necessary changes in the longer run. Thus, one head of Delega-
tion argued: ’In the long term, delegations should represent and in a way also 
substitute Member States’ embassies. There would be greater efficiency, pow-
er, credibility and authoritativeness. We really come to the core of the Member 
States’ sovereignty. There is strong opposition, which is normal. This is why 
100 Ibid. section 3.3.2.
101 A case in point was Case C-293/95 Odigitra AAE v Council and Commission [1996] ECR 
I-06129.
102 As was announced in ‘Consular protection for EU citizens in third countries: State of play 
and way forward’, Commission Communication, COM(2011) 149 final. See also M. Moraru, ‘The 
Protection of Citizens in the World: A legal Assessment of the EU Citizen’s Right to Protection 
Abroad’, in Larik and Moraru (eds.), ‘Ever-Closer in Brussels – Ever-Closer in the World? EU 
External Action after the Lisbon Treaty’, EUI Working Paper LAW 2011/10 107-124.
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European foreign policy is fragmented, inefficient and weak: the EU is an eco-
nomic giant and a political dwarf, but we can hope that things will evolve in a 
significant way even in this field.’103
Our findings underline a tension between the EU’s diplomatic ambitions and 
EU and international law as it stands. In the first section we examined the EU’s 
new structures from an internal perspective, and our conclusions are neces-
sarily mixed. On the one hand, there is no doubt that in the new EU institu-
tional landscape dividing lines remain firmly in place. Divisions within the 
wider ‘RELEx family’ in Brussels, as well divisions between the Member States 
and the Union itself, are visible in different echelons of EU external diplomacy. 
In our submission, the previous picture points that intra-EU structures are cer-
tainly not yet final, but that the working arrangements do point to ‘holistic’ 
thinking implying cooperation and reciprocity. Turf wars may exist intra-institu-
tionally, but they seem minor in comparison to the deep schism between the 
EU and its Member States. Thus, as far as diplomatic ambitions and diplo-
matic dreams, we find that within the institutions, EU delegations as one-stop-
shops for ‘EU diplomacy’ encompassing the EU institutions only is a dream on 
its way to be realized with the usual bumps and bruises. however, ’EU diplo-
macy”’ as also encompassing the Member States, seems rather far off, as was 
illustrated by the UK stance in relation to the International Civil Aviation Or-
ganisation. 
The next section focused rather on International diplomatic law, which reg-
ulates the diplomatic relations between states and international organizations 
simply do not fit into the existing legal regimes. Whereas in the area of diplo-
matic representation we have seen a pragmatic acceptance of a ‘contracting 
in’ strategy by the EU (allowing for instance for heads of Delegations to be 
accepted alongside states Embassies), the diplomatic and consular protection 
of citizens is too much related to the notion of ‘nationality’. As one author noted: 
‘[…] EU citizenship has not yet acquired the status of nationality (or of a simi-
larly solid link) at international level, so as to justify the intervention of any 
Member State for the protection of any EU citizen, regardless of his/her nation-
ality. One cannot deny that, in recent years, there seems to be a development 
of the idea that a solid link may also exist between an EU citizen and his/her 
Member State of residence. however, international law does not seem to have 
recognized the legitimacy of these new developments occurring within the EU 
legal system.’104
The practical implication is that third states will have to accept that the EU 
acts on behalf of its citizens. At the same time, the EU Member States do not 
seem to be willing to give up their traditional competences in his area: ‘consu-
lar protection is an area of Member State competence and Member State 
103 C. Carta, op.cit., at 115.
104 P. Vigni, ‘The Protection of EU Citizens: The Perspective of International Law’, in J. Larik 
and M. Moraru (eds.), ‘Ever-Closer in Brussels – Ever-Closer in the World? EU External Action 
after the Lisbon Treaty’, EUI Working Paper LAW 2011/10, at 102.
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competence solely’.105 As a consequence, ‘[r]ather than a zero-sum relation-
ship, Member States and the EU as a collective foreign policy actor may oper-
ate along-side, across and in tandem with one another’.106 While this may form 
a solution for the short term, the EU’s ambitions seem to go beyond a mere 
coordinating role. International law does not per se block a further development 
of the EEAS (and its Delegations) in the area of diplomatic and consular pro-
tection, but further steps will not only have to be accepted by the EU Member 
States, but obviously also by third states (on the basis of bilateral agreements). 
We believe that in the years to come a pragmatic acceptance of a new role of 
the EU will have an impact on the interpretation and perhaps even on the na-
ture of international diplomatic law as primarily inter-state law.
105 M. Lindström, ‘EU Consular Protection in Crisis Situations’, in S. Olsson (ed.), Crisis Man-
agement in the European Union: Cooperation in the Face of Emergencies, Berlin/heidelberg: 
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